Mathematics of Operations Research is an international journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). The journal invites articles concerned with the mathematical and computational foundations in the areas of continuous, discrete, and stochastic optimization; mathematical programming; dynamic programming; stochastic processes; stochastic models; simulation methodology; control and adaptation; networks; game theory; and decision theory. Also sought are contributions to learning theory and machine learning that have special relevance to decision making, operations research, and management science. The emphasis is on originality, quality, and importance; correctness alone is not sufficient. Significant developments in operations research and management science not having substantial mathematical interest should be directed to other journals such as Management Science or Operations Research.

Special Issue on Mathematics of Market Design
截稿日期: 2024-09-30

Rationale:

Market design is a field at the intersection of Operations Research, Computer Science, and Microeconomics focusing on design and analysis of performance of market mechanisms for allocation of scarce resources. The impact of market design and operations research has been mutual. On one hand, market allocation, coordination, and pricing problems arise naturally in many operations research problems, requiring new insights to address challenges due to scale, supply/demand uncertainty, limited information, interconnectedness of the modern practical settings. On the other hand, design of economic mechanisms for distributed large scale resource allocation has been strongly influenced by operations research techniques. This connection between market design and operations research has been critical in numerous successful practical applications: from spectrum auctions, procurement auctions, to energy markets, digital advertising markets to platform business models.

Scope:

The special issue will focus on mathematical and methodological contributions that consider design and performance of market mechanisms including allocative efficiency, stability, fairness, strategic, and computational complexity. Potential topics of interest for this special issue include, but are not limited to, allocation and pricing in markets with indivisible goods; matching markets without money; algorithmic mechanism design; information design; learning in games and markets; etc.

Guest Editorial Board:

The special issue will be guest edited by:

    Saša Pekeč, Duke University
    Martin Bichler, Technical University of Munich
    Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research
    Scott Kominers, Harvard University
    Paul Milgrom, Stanford University

In addition, the MOR Advisory Editors Alvin Roth (Stanford University) and Eva Tardos (Cornell University) will support the special issue.